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Sunday, May 10, 2020 | History

3 edition of The doctrine of the offensive in the French army on the eve of World War I found in the catalog.

The doctrine of the offensive in the French army on the eve of World War I

Joel A. Setzen

The doctrine of the offensive in the French army on the eve of World War I

by Joel A. Setzen

  • 306 Want to read
  • 24 Currently reading

Published .
Written in English


Edition Notes

Statementby Joel A. Setzen.
Classifications
LC ClassificationsMicrofilm 50092 (D)
The Physical Object
FormatMicroform
Paginationv, 239 p.
Number of Pages239
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL2161298M
LC Control Number88890235

Focused on preventing another German incursion into French territory, Paris had formed a military doctrine giving primacy to the defensive. The intent was to first blunt any invasion, and once the. the source of military doctrine Download the source of military doctrine or read online books in PDF, EPUB, Tuebl, and Mobi Format. Click Download or Read Online button to get the source of military doctrine book now. This site is like a library, Use search box in the widget to get ebook that you want.

“The French army, returning to its traditions, henceforth admits no law but the offensive,” was the way the Field Regulations of summed up training and doctrine. These were put to the test the following year, with catastrophic results. The French Army Between the Wars. At the core of French civil-military relations for the past two centuries had been fear on the part of the political left of repression by the regular army.

Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, (), by Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, is a seminal and important book, tracing changes in military doctrine from the perspective of the artillery arm from World War I through World War II.   Unless Tokyo was willing to risk an early war with the British (and possibly the Americans), it would have needed to seize French Indochina in the first days of its December offensive, which.


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The doctrine of the offensive in the French army on the eve of World War I by Joel A. Setzen Download PDF EPUB FB2

The book primarily sets out to trace the etiology of the disastrous performance of the French Army in ( million casualties in opening 15 months of war). It also offers a refreshing and provocative new history of the French army from to without examining it through the Cited by: Clayton begins Paths of Glory with a chapter on the French frontier offensive in and then backtracks in the second chapter to discuss pre-war strategy and doctrine.

After this, Clayton then devotes one chapter to operations in each year of the war, plus a separate chapter on developments within the French army/5(7). Title: No Other Law: The French Army and the Doctrine of the Offensive Author: Charles W.

Sanders Subject: This paper discusses the inception, formulation, implementation, and consequences of the doctrine used by the French Army in World War I as an example of what can happen when the best people, with the best intentions, select a doctrine that is compB µGLz Ñ,c ¤Ö ¬þ «v_ 2õÛ+«m.

It was primarily a failure of doctrine rather than any equipment shortcomings that did in the French. The French Army divided control of its tanks between the infantry and cavalry.

Infantry commanders saw the tanks solely as a means of infantry support; the cavalry regarded them. Posen isolates three crucial elements of a given strategic doctrine: its offensive, defensive, or deterrent characteristics, its integration of military Posen isolates three crucial elements of a given strategic doctrine: its offensive, defensive, or deterrent characteristics, its integration of military resources with political aims, and the degree of military or operational innovation it contains/5.

French Army doctrine was developed at the French War College (the École Superieure de Guerre), yet it was the French War College that rehashed the same doctrine of World War I. Advocacy networks also existed. De Gaulle clearly filled that role in his writings, but his ideas clashed dramatically with those of the War College.

The most remarkable, perhaps even embarrassing, example of such mindset would be General Duchêne, whose refusal to apply the defense-in-depth doctrine advocated by Pétain’s “Directive N°4”, issued the 22nd of December * during the German offensive in the Aisne the 27th of May nearly led to the collapse of the French 6th Army.

Cult of the offensive. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Jump to navigation Jump to search. Map of the Schlieffen Plan and planned French counter-offensives. The cult of the offensive refers to a strategic military dilemma in which leaders believe that offensive advantages are so great that a defending force would have no hope of repelling the attack and therefore choose to attack.

When war broke out in Maythe French army found itself saddled with a highly defensive doctrine that was incapable of breaking the German assault. France used the interwar period to bolster its military and was well prepared to fight a war against Germany-but only if Hitler fought the war on French terms.

As Elizabeth Greenhalgh alludes to in the introduction of her well-researched and constructed monograph, The French Army and the First World War, common perceptions of France’s military experience between and have tended to be reduced to mere flashpoints of s examples would naturally include the Miracle of the Marne, Verdun and the.

Barry R. Posen explores how military doctrine takes shape and the role it plays in grand strategy-that collection of military, economic, and political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security.

Posen isolates three crucial elements of a given strategic doctrine: its offensive, defensive, or deterrent characteristics, its integration of military resources with political 3/5(1).

'The French Army and the First World War is a tour de force and will remain the single best book on its subject for the foreseeable future. Enhanced by well-chosen photographs, detailed tables, and a helpful, concise bibliographic essay, it is essential reading for all students of the French military, World War I, and military history in general.'Cited by: 7.

The Seeds of Disaster book. Read 4 reviews from the world's largest community for readers. Book by Doughty, Robert A. The Development of French Army Doctrine, ” as Want to Read: probably the best book to read to understand how the French Army thought at the start of World War 2.

Nicely organized and covers most everything/5. France had used the interwar period to bolster its military and was prepared to fight a war against Germany—but only if Hitler fought the war on French terms.

When war broke out in Maythe French army had a defensive doctrine that was incapable of breaking the German assault. As a result, few defeats were as rapid or as devastating as.

An aggressive doctrine making the offensive the sole focus of French military endeavour, offensive á l'outrance, dominated this plan. French élan would carry the day and sweep the Germans from the field at the point of the bayonet. Instead, war was looked upon by many leaders in as a contest of national wills, spirit, and courage.

A prime example of this attitude was the French army, which was dominated by the doctrine of the offensive. French military doctrine called for headlong bayonet charges of French infantrymen against the German rifles, machine guns, and.

The French hubris from victory in World War I, overreliance on coalition warfare, and failure to ensure timely fielding of new military equipment resulted in its humiliating defeat in Case Red is highly recommended for anyone interested in the study of the fall of France, the French army, or the war in Western Europe.

Military doctrine is the expression of how military forces contribute to campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. It is a guide to action, rather than hard and fast rules. Doctrine provides a common frame of reference across the military.

It helps standardize operations, facilitating readiness by establishing common ways of accomplishing military tasks. Get this from a library. No other law: the French Army and the doctrine of the offensive. [Charles W Sanders; Rand Corporation.] -- "This paper discusses the inception, formulation, implementation, and consequences of the doctrine used by the French Army in World War I as an example of what can happen when the best people, with.

Rynning explores civil-military relations and in particular the role of armed forces in the making of military doctrine. Using the relationship between armed forces and civilians in France from to the present as a detailed case study, he shows the limitations of policy-makers in controlling military doctrine and also analyzes how the armed.

[commander of French military] was an ardent admirer of the all-out offensive, l’offensive à out-rance. He vowed never again to allow a French army to be encircled as at Sedan.”1 It was from these origins that the spirit of the offense became the cornerstone of all the major powers’ military strategies.

Prior to the Great War, a Polish.A Policy of Defeat. David Campbell and Jesse McIntyre III. Time Magazine commented in August that French Army General Maurice Gamelin was head, by unanimous acclaim, of the world’s finest military machine.

The sentiment was echoed by English Prime Minister Churchill who remarked that the French had an incomparable military machine and that the French Army was the most perfectly .World War II - World War II - Forces and resources of the European combatants, In September the Allies, namely Great Britain, France, and Poland, were together superior in industrial resources, population, and military manpower, but the German Army, or Wehrmacht, because of its armament, training, doctrine, discipline, and fighting spirit, was the most efficient and effective.